Fitch Ratings
Fitch Ratings is a global credit rating agency that assesses the creditworthiness of companies, governments, and the bonds they issue, assigning letter grades from AAA (highest quality, lowest default risk) down to D (in default). Along with Moody's and S&P Global Ratings, Fitch is one of the "Big Three" agencies whose ratings are used throughout the bond markets to price and assess risk.
Fitch was founded in 1913 by John Knowles Fitch as the Fitch Publishing Company in New York, making it the oldest of the three major agencies. It is dual-headquartered in New York and London today and is majority owned by the American media company Hearst through the Fitch Group. A notable example of Fitch's influence: in August 2023, Fitch downgraded the United States' long-term credit rating from AAA to AA+, citing rising debt and repeated debt-ceiling standoffs, a move that rattled bond and equity markets even though it only echoed a similar downgrade S&P had made back in 2011.
Fitch's ratings matter most directly in bond markets: a rating downgrade typically raises the interest rate a government or company must pay to borrow, since investors demand more compensation for perceived higher risk. This flows through to stock markets as well, since a sovereign downgrade can shift broader risk sentiment, and to forex, since a country's credit rating feeds into how attractive its currency and government bonds look to foreign investors. Fitch ratings are not directly used for commodities or crypto, though the corporate bonds of commodity producers and any crypto-adjacent companies that issue debt are still rated using the same scale.
The structural criticism of all three major agencies is about who pays. Under the issuer-pays model that has dominated since the 1970s, the company or government being rated selects the agency and pays its fee, which means the agency's customer is the party whose creditworthiness it is judging. Since an issuer can approach more than one agency and use the rating it prefers, the incentive to be accommodating is built into the arrangement rather than dependent on anyone behaving badly. The agencies answer that their reputation is their only asset and that the analysts who assign ratings are separated from the staff who negotiate fees, and both points have force. The model persists mainly because the alternative, charging investors, collapses once the rating is published and can be passed on freely.
The consequences were severe in structured finance, where the conflict was sharpest. Mortgage-backed securities were assembled by a small number of repeat issuers who knew in advance how the rating models worked and could design deals to just clear the threshold for a top grade, and the fees for rating those deals were far larger than for rating an ordinary corporate bond. Large volumes of paper rated triple-A in 2006 were in default within three years. The regulatory response was less about policing the agencies than about reducing dependence on them: legislation passed in the United States in 2010 required federal regulators to remove mechanical references to credit ratings from their rules, so that a downgrade could no longer by itself force a regulated institution to sell. Similar steps followed in Europe. What none of it changed is the commercial reality that index rules, investment mandates and collateral agreements written by private parties still reference ratings, which is why a downgrade still moves prices even where the law no longer requires it to.