Mark to Market (MTM)
Mark to market, often abbreviated MTM, is the practice of valuing an asset, position or account balance at its current market price, rather than at the price it was originally purchased for or some other fixed historical value. If you own something that is marked to market, your recorded profit or loss updates continuously (or at least periodically) to reflect what the position is actually worth right now - not what you paid for it.
The concept is most visible, and most consequential in day-to-day trading, in futures markets, where mark to market isn't just an accounting convention but an active daily cash settlement process. Every trading day, a futures exchange's clearinghouse recalculates the value of every open futures position based on that day's official settlement price, and credits or debits each trader's margin account accordingly - profits are paid out in cash daily, and losses are deducted in cash daily, rather than only being realized when the position is eventually closed. This is why futures margin accounts need to be actively monitored and topped up: a losing position can trigger a margin call the very next morning, well before the trader has decided to exit the trade.
A concrete example: a trader buys one gold futures contract (representing 100 troy ounces) at $4,400 per ounce. The next day, gold settles at $4,415 per ounce. Mark to market credits the trader's account with $1,500 (100 ounces × $15 gain) in cash that same day, even though the trader still holds the open position and hasn't sold anything. If gold instead fell to $4,385 the next day, the account would be debited $1,500 in cash, and if that debit pushed the account below the maintenance margin level, the trader would receive a margin call demanding additional funds.
Mark to market accounting became a subject of intense public debate during the 2008 global financial crisis. Banks and financial institutions were required under US accounting rule FAS 157 (fair value accounting) to mark many of their mortgage-backed securities and related assets to market prices - but during the crisis, markets for these securities became so illiquid and distressed that "market price" often meant a fire-sale price from a handful of desperate, forced transactions, not a price reflecting the assets' actual long-term cash-flow value. Critics argued this forced a vicious cycle: falling prices triggered write-downs, write-downs forced further asset sales to raise capital, and those sales pushed prices down further still. In response, accounting standard-setters issued guidance in 2009 (FAS 157-e) giving institutions more flexibility in valuing assets in disorderly markets, a change that remains a reference point in debates about the pros and cons of fair-value accounting during periods of market stress.
Mark to market applies broadly across asset classes wherever a position is held with an actively traded market price available: forex positions, stock portfolios, commodity futures and crypto derivatives are all typically marked to market by brokers for the purpose of calculating unrealized profit and loss, margin requirements and account equity in real time, even though only futures-style products settle those gains and losses in cash on a strict daily basis the way exchange-traded futures do.
The argument about fair value has a second half that receives far less attention than the crisis story, and it runs in the opposite direction. Accounting rules sort assets into three levels according to how their valuation is derived: quoted prices in active markets, values built from observable inputs such as the prices of similar instruments, and values produced by models using inputs that cannot be observed at all. Assets in the third category are marked to model rather than to market, with the institution holding them choosing the assumptions that determine the answer.
That is where the most complex and least liquid holdings sit, and it means both criticisms of fair value accounting are true simultaneously. Under stress it can force a valuation that reflects panic rather than worth, which was the complaint in 2008. Outside stress it can permit a valuation that reflects nothing but the holder's own estimate, with no market price to contradict it and no auditor able to verify an input that does not exist anywhere to be verified. The disclosures identify how much of a balance sheet sits in each level, and the proportion in the third is one of the more informative numbers available about a financial institution, precisely because it measures how much of the reported value is an opinion.